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Introduction
This number of the Savage Minds Occasional Paper Series presents an edited version of 
Edward Sapir's essay "Culture, Genuine and Spurious." “Culture, Genuine and Spurious” is 
worth reading for several reasons: it demonstrates the way anthropological theory can be applied 
to ethical issues; it exemplifies the way Boasians founded public anthropology by weighing in on 
the great issues of their day alongside cultural critics like Randolph Bourne or George Seldes; it 
gives us insights into the opinions of Boasians on cultural imperialism and the exploitation of 
labor; and above all, it presents us with a set of questions -- and answers -- that are as relevant 
today as they were eighty years ago. 
What kind of a good thing is culture? In asking this question, Sapir describes the role that 
culture can play in the flourishing lives of individuals, as well as the communities that they are 
part of. His answer to this question, although inspired by anthropology, also draws on his wider 
education. As a result, Sapir’s essay presents us with an example of how anthropology can 
become a form of cultural criticism.
Sapir wrote this essay with modern American culture in mind. On the one hand, he was 
appalled by the demands industrialization made on workers and depressed by the cheapness and 
vulgarity of the mass consumerism that was meant to satisfy them. On the other hand, he found 
American elite’s uptake of European high culture snobbish, artificial, and inauthentic. For Sapir, 
both ossified ‘high culture’ and the new consumerism were ‘spurious’ forms of culture.
In contrast, Sapir considered culture ‘genuine’ when it drew on the past in order to enrich the 
lives of people in the present. It was honest, deeply involved people in its production, and 
created a deep sense of community. Authenticity in culture, from Sapir’s point of view, is more 
about the mode of cultural production than the contents. 
There is much more to say about Sapir as a cultural critic, and I hope to explore his work in 
future SMOPs. Ultimately, however, I believe that Sapir’s argument is so interesting that it needs 
no introduction.
The version of “Culture, Genuine and Spurious” in this SMOPS has been lightly edited, from 
about 12,000 words to 8,500. My main goal in presenting this paper has not been to slash it down 
to a readable size, but to trim some of the more excessive prose and, above all, to help bring 
attention to this remarkable essay. I hope that this paper, like the others in this series, will help 
present early anthropological theory in a form that is accessible to everyone. There is today a 
tremendous amount of material which is open access, but it is difficult to find, inconvenient to 
read, and many people do not know where to start looking for it. By curating a selection of 
important open access work, I hope to make open access resources better known and to raise 
awareness of the actual history of anthropological theory.
-R
5 Nov 2013
Honolulu
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Culture, Genuine and Spurious
Edward Sapir
I. THE VARYING CONCEPTIONS OF CULTURE
There are certain terms that have a peculiar property. Ostensibly, they mark off specific 
concepts that lay claim to a rigorously objective validity. In practice, they label vague terrains of 
thought that shift or narrow or widen with the point of view of whoso makes use of them. An 
analysis of such terms discloses the fact that underneath the clash of varying contents there is a 
unifying feeling-tone. What makes it possible for so discordant an array of conceptions to answer 
to the same call is precisely this constant halo that surrounds them. Thus, what is "crime" to one 
man is "nobility" to another, yet both are agreed that crime, whatever it is, is an undesirable 
category. We disagree on the value of things and the relations of things, but we agree on the 
value of a label. It is only when the question arises of just where to put the label, that trouble 
begins. These labels -- perhaps we had better call them empty thrones -- are enemies of mankind, 
yet we have no recourse but to make peace with them. We do this by seating our favorite 
pretenders. The rival pretenders war to the death; the thrones to which they aspire remain 
serenely splendid in gold. I desire to advance the claims of a pretender to the throne called 
"culture," Whatever culture is, we know that it is a good thing. I propose to give my idea of what 
kind of a good thing culture is.
The word "culture" [is] used in three main senses. First of all, culture is technically used by 
the ethnologist and culture-historian to embody any socially inherited element in the life of man, 
material and spiritual. Culture so defined is coterminous with man himself, for even the lowliest 
savages live in a social world characterized by a complex network of traditionally conserved 
habits, usages, and attitudes. From this standpoint all human groups are cultured, though in 
vastly different manners and grades of complexity. For the ethnologist there are many types of 
culture and an infinite variety of elements of culture, but no values attach to these. His "higher" 
and "lower," refer not to a moral scale of values but to stages, real or supposed, in a historic 
progression or in an evolutionary scheme. I do not intend to use the term "culture" in this 
technical sense. “Civilization" would be a convenient substitute for it, were it not by common 
usage limited rather to the more complex and sophisticated forms of the stream of culture. To 
avoid confusion with other uses of the word "culture," I shall, where necessary, use "civilization" 
in lieu of the ethnologist's "culture."
The second application of the term is more widely current. It refers to a rather conventional 
ideal of individual refinement. Sophistication in the realm of intellectual goods is demanded of 
the applicant to the title of "cultured person," but only up to a certain point. Far more emphasis is 
placed upon a certain preciousness of conduct. At its worst, the preciousness degenerates into 
snobbishness. At its most subtle, it develops into an amused skepticism of even more radical 
aloofness than snobbishness. Aloofness of some kind is generally a sine qua non of the second 
type of culture. Another of its requisites is intimate contact with the past. Present action and 
opinion are, first and foremost, seen in the illumination of a past of infinite richness and glory. 
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The ghosts of the past haunt the cultured man at every step. He shrinks from the employment of 
his individuality as a creative agency. But perhaps the most extraordinary thing about the 
cultured ideal is its selection of the particular treasures of the past which it deems worthiest of 
worship. This selection, which might seem bizarre to a mere outsider, is justified by a number of 
reasons, but unsympathetic persons incline to the view that these reasons are only 
rationalizations ad hoc, that the selection of treasures has proceeded chiefly according to the 
accidents of history.
In brief, this cultured ideal is a vesture and an air. The vesture may drape gracefully about 
one's person and the air has often much charm, but the vesture is a ready-made garment for all 
that and the air remains an air. In America the cultured ideal is a more exotic plant than in the 
halls of Oxford and Cambridge, whence it was imported to these rugged shores, but fragments 
and derivatives of it meet us frequently enough. Wherever we find it, it discloses itself to our 
eyes in the guise of a spiritual heirloom that must, at all cost, be preserved intact.
The third use made of the term is the least easy to define. Culture in this third sense shares 
with our first, technical, conception an emphasis on the spiritual possessions of the group rather 
than of the individual. With our second conception it shares a stressing of selected factors out of 
the vast whole of the ethnologist's stream of culture as intrinsically more valuable, more 
characteristic, more significant in a spiritual sense than the rest. We may perhaps come nearest 
the mark by saying that the cultural conception we are now trying to grasp embrace[s] in a single 
term those general attitudes, views of life, and specific manifestations of civilization that give a 
particular people its distinctive place in the world. Emphasis is put not so much on what is done 
and believed by a people as on how what is done and believed functions in the whole life of that 
people, on what significance it has for them. The present conception of culture is apt to crop up 
in problems of nationality, with attempts to find embodied in the character and civilization of a 
given people some peculiar excellence that is strikingly its own. Culture thus becomes nearly 
synonymous with the "spirit" or "genius" of a people, yet not altogether, for culture includes a 
series of concrete manifestations which are believed to be peculiarly symptomatic of it. Culture, 
then, may be briefly defined as civilization in so far as it embodies the national genius.
We are on dangerous ground here. The current assumption that the so-called "genius" of a 
people is reducible to inherent hereditary traits of a biological and psychological nature does not 
bear very serious examination. Frequently what is assumed to be an innate racial characteristic 
turns out to be the resultant of purely historical causes. There need be no quarrel with this 
conception of a national genius so long as it is not worshiped as an irreducible psychological 
fetich. Ethnologists might shy of broad generalizations and hazily defined concepts. They are 
therefore rather timid about operating with national spirits and geniuses. The chauvinism of 
national apologists, which sees in the spirits of their own peoples peculiar excellences utterly 
denied to less blessed denizens of the globe, justifies this timidity. Yet here, as so often, the 
precise knowledge of the scientist lags somewhat behind the more naive but more powerful 
insights of non-professional experience and impression. To deny to the genius of a people an 
ultimate psychological significance and to refer it to the specific historical development of that 
people is not, after all is said and done, to analyze it out of existence. It remains true that large 
groups of people everywhere tend to think and to act in accordance with established and all but 
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instinctive forms, which are in large measure peculiar to it. The question as to whether these 
forms, that in their interrelations constitute the genius of a people, are primarily explainable in 
terms of native temperament, of historical development need not cause us much concern. It is 
enough to know that in actual fact nationalities have come to bear the impress of a certain mold 
and that this mold is more clearly discernible in certain elements of civilization than in others. 
The specific culture of a nationality is that group of elements in its civilization which most 
emphatically exhibits the mold. In practice it is sometimes convenient to identify the national 
culture with its genius.
An example or two and we shall have done with these preliminary definitions. No one who 
has even superficially concerned himself with French culture can have failed to be impressed by 
the qualities of clarity, lucid systematization, balance, care in choice of means, and good taste, 
that permeate so many aspects of the national civilization. These qualities have their weaker side. 
We are familiar with the overmechanization, the emotional timidity or shallowness, the 
exaggeration of manner at the expense of content, that are revealed in some of the manifestations 
of the French spirit. Those elements of French civilization that give characteristic evidence of the 
qualities of its genius may be said to constitute the culture of France. From this standpoint we 
can evaluate culturally such traits in French civilization as the formalism of the French classical 
drama, the prevalence of epigram in French life and letters, the intellectualist cast so often given 
to aesthetic movements in France, the lack of turgidity in modern French music, the relative 
absence of the ecstatic note in religion, the strong tendency to bureaucracy in French 
administration. Their study would yield something like a rapid bird's-eye view of the spirit of 
French culture.
Let us turn to Russia, the culture of which has as definite a cast as that of France. I shall 
mention only one, but that perhaps the most significant, aspect of Russian culture, as I see it - the 
tendency of the Russian to see and think of human beings not as representatives of types, not as 
creatures that appear eternally clothed in the garments of civilization, but as stark human beings 
existing primarily in and for themselves, only secondarily for the sake of civilization. The one 
thing that the Russian can take seriously is elemental humanity, and elemental humanity, in his 
view of the world, obtrudes itself at every step. He is therefore sublimely at home with himself 
and his neighbor and with God. Indeed, I have no doubt that the extremest of Russian atheists is 
on better speaking terms with God than are the devout of other lands. For all the machinery of 
civilization, the Russian has generally not a little contempt. The subordination of the deeps of 
personality to an institution is not readily swallowed by him as a necessary price for the blessings 
of civilization. We can follow out this sweeping humanity, this almost impertinent prodding of 
the real self that lies swathed in civilization, in numberless forms. In personal relations we may 
note the readiness of the Russian to ignore all the institutional barriers which separate man from 
man; on its weaker side, this involves at times a personal irresponsibility that harbors no 
insincerity. The renunciation of Tolstoi was no isolated phenomenon, it was a symbol of the 
deep-seated Russian indifference to institutionalism, to the accreted values of civilization. In a 
spiritual sense, it is easy for the Russian to overthrow any embodiment of the spirit of 
institutionalism; his real loyalties are elsewhere. The Russian preoccupation with elemental 
humanity is naturally most in evidence in the realm of art, where self-expression has freest rein. 
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In the pages of Tolstoi, Dostoyevski, Turgenev, Gorki, and Chekhov personality runs riot in its 
morbid moments of play with crime, in its depressions and apathies, in its generous enthusiasms 
and idealisms. So many of the figures in Russian literature look out upon life with a puzzled and 
incredulous gaze. "This thing that you call civilization - is that all there is to life?" we hear them 
ask a hundred times. In music too the Russian spirit delights to unmask itself, to revel in the cries 
and gestures of man as man. It speaks to us out of the rugged accents of a Moussorgski as out of 
the well-nigh unendurable despair of a Tchaikovski. It is hard to think of the main current of 
Russian art as anywhere infected by the dry rot of formalism; we expect some human flash or cry  
to escape from behind the bars.
I have avoided all attempt to construct a parallel between the spirit of French civilization and 
that of Russian civilization. I have been content merely to suggest that underlying the elements 
of civilization, the study of which is the province of the ethnologist and culture-historian, is a 
culture, the adequate interpretation of which is beset with difficulties and which is often left to 
men of letters.
II. THE GENUINE CULTURE
The second and third conceptions of the term "culture" are what I wish to make the basis of 
our genuine culture - the pretender to the throne whose claims to recognition we are to consider. 
We may accept culture as signifying the characteristic mold of a national civilization, while from 
the second conception of culture, that of a traditional type of individual refinement, we will 
borrow the notion of ideal form. A genuine culture is perfectly conceivable in any type or stage 
of civilization, in the mold of any national genius. It can be conceived as easy in terms of a 
Mohammedan polygamous society, or of an American Indian "primitive" non-agricultural 
society, as in those of our familiar occidental societies. On the other hand, what may by contrast 
be called "spurious" cultures are just as easily conceivable in conditions of general enlightenment 
as in those of relative ignorance and squalor.
The genuine culture is not of necessity either high or low; it is inherently harmonious, 
balanced, self-satisfactory. It is the expression of a richly varied and yet unified and consistent 
attitude toward life, an attitude which sees the significance of any one element of civilization in 
its relation to all others. It is a culture in which nothing is spiritually meaningless, in which no 
important part of the general functioning brings with it a sense of frustration, of misdirected or 
unsympathetic effort. It is not a spiritual hybrid of contradictory patches, of water-tight 
compartments of consciousness that avoid participation in a harmonious synthesis. If the culture 
necessitates slavery, it frankly admits it; if it abhors slavery, it obviates the necessity of its 
employment. It does not make a great show of an uncompromising opposition to slavery, only to 
introduce what amounts to a slave system into certain portions of its industrial mechanism. If it 
builds itself magnificent houses of worship, it is because of the necessity it feels to symbolize in 
stone a religious impulse that is deep and vital. It does not look sheepish when appeal is made to 
its religious consciousness, then make amends by furtively donating a few dollars toward an 
African mission. Nor does it carefully instruct its children in what it knows to be of no use either 
to them or in its own mature life. Nor does it tolerate a thousand other spiritual maladjustments 
such as are patent enough in our American life of today. The great cultures that we instinctively 
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feel to have been healthy spiritual organisms, such as the Athenian culture of the Age of Pericles, 
have tended to such harmony.
A genuine culture has no necessary connection with efficiency. A society may be admirably 
efficient, yet it may well be an inferior organism as a culture-bearer. It is not enough that each 
member of the community feel in some dim way that he is doing his bit toward the attainment of 
a social benefit. A genuine culture refuses to consider the individual as a mere cog. The major 
activities of the individual must directly satisfy his own creative and emotional impulses. The 
great cultural fallacy of industrialism, as developed up to the present time, is that in harnessing 
machines to our uses it has not known how to avoid the harnessing of the majority of mankind to 
its machines. The telephone girl who lends her capacities to the manipulation of a technical 
routine that has a high efficiency value but that answers to no spiritual needs of her own is an 
appalling sacrifice to civilization. As with the telephone girl, so, it is to be feared, with the great 
majority of us, slave-stokers to fires that burn for demons we would destroy, were it not that they 
appear in the guise of our benefactors. The American Indian who solves the economic problem 
with salmon-spear and rabbit-snare operates on a relatively low level of civilization, but he 
represents an incomparably higher solution than our telephone girl of the questions that culture 
has to ask of economics because there is no sense of spiritual frustration during its prosecution, 
because it works in naturally with all the rest of the Indian's activities instead of standing out as a 
desert patch of merely economic effort in the whole of life. A genuine culture must be looked 
upon as a sturdy plant growth, each remotest leal and twig of which is organically fed by the sap 
at the core. And this growth is not here meant as a metaphor for the group only; it is meant to 
apply as well to the individual. A culture that does not build itself out of the central interests and 
desires of its bearers is an external culture. The genuine culture is internal, it works from the 
individual to ends.
We have already seen that there is no necessary correlation between the development of 
civilization and the relative genuineness of the culture which forms its spiritual essence. By the 
development of civilization is meant the ever increasing degree of sophistication of our society 
and of our individual lives. This progressive sophistication is the inevitable cumulative result of 
our steadily growing knowledge of our natural environment and, as a consequence, our practical 
mastery of the resources that nature grants us. It is chiefly the cumulative force of this 
sophistication that gives us the sense of what we call ''progress." Perched on the heights of an 
office building twenty or more stories taller than our fathers ever dreamed of, we feel that we are 
getting up in the world. It would be sheer obscurantism to wish to stay their progress. But there 
can be no stranger illusion than this, that because the tools of life are today more specialized and 
more refined than ever before, it necessarily follows that we are attaining a deeper and more 
satisfying culture. We are right to have faith in the progress of civilization. We are wrong to 
assume that the advance of culture is a function of such progress. The facts of ethnology and 
culture history proves that maxima of culture have frequently been reached in low levels of 
sophistication; that minima of culture have been plumbed in some of the highest. Civilization, as 
a whole, moves on; culture comes and goes.
Every profound change in the flow of civilization, particularly every change in its economic 
bases, tends to bring about an unsettling and readjustment of culture values. Old culture forms 
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tend to persist through the force of inertia. The maladjustment of these habitual reactions to their 
new civilizational environment brings a measure of spiritual disharmony. Sometimes the 
maladjustment corrects itself with great rapidity, at other times it may persist for generations, as 
in the case of America, where a chronic state of cultural maladjustment has reduced much of our 
higher life to sterile externality. It is easier for a genuine culture to subsist on a lower level of 
civilization; the differentiation of individuals as regards their social and economic functions is so 
much less than in the higher levels that there is less danger of the reduction of the individual to 
an unintelligible fragment of the social organism. How to reap the benefits of a great 
differentiation of functions, without at the same time losing sight of the individual, is the great 
problem of any rapidly complicating civilization. The present world-wide labor unrest has as one 
of its deepest roots some sort of perception of the cultural fallacy of the present form of 
industrialism.
It is the ethnologist who has studied an aboriginal civilization at first hand who is most 
impressed by the frequent vitality of culture in less sophisticated levels. He cannot but admire the 
well-rounded life of the average participant in the civilization of a typical American Indian tribe; 
the firmness with which every part of that life is bound together into a significant whole in which 
he is far from a passive pawn; above all, the molding role that he plays in the mechanism of his 
culture. When the political integrity of his tribe is destroyed by contact with the whites and the 
old cultural values cease to have the atmosphere needed for their continued vitality, the Indian 
finds himself in a state of bewildered vacuity. Even if he succeeds in making a compromise with 
his new environment, in making what his well-wishers consider great progress toward 
enlightenment, he is apt to retain an uneasy sense of loss. What has happened is that he has 
slipped out of the warm embrace of a culture into the cold air of fragmentary existence. What is 
sad about the passing of the Indian is not the depletion of his numbers by disease nor even the 
contempt that is too often meted out to him, it is the fading away of genuine cultures, built 
though they were out of the materials of a low order of sophistication.
We have no right to demand [that] the higher levels of sophistication preserve the individual 
his manifold functioning, but we ask whether, as a compensation, the individual may demand an 
intensification in cultural value, a spiritual heightening, of such functions as are left him. The 
limitation in functioning works chiefly in the economic sphere. It is therefore imperative, if the 
individual is to preserve his value as a cultured being, that he compensate himself out of the non-
economic, the non-utilitarian spheres-social, religious, scientific, aesthetic. This idea of 
compensation brings to view an important issue, that of the immediate and the remoter ends of 
human effort.
As a mere organism, man's only function is to keep himself alive and to propagate his kind. 
There are civilizations, like that of the Eskimo, in which by far the greater part of man's energy is 
consumed in the satisfaction of these immediate ends. There are practically no civilizations, 
however, in which at least some of the available energy is not set free for the remoter ends, 
though, as a rule, these remoter ends are by a process of rationalization made to seem to 
contribute to the immediate ones. (A magical ritual, for instance, which seems to liberate and 
give form to powerful emotional aesthetic elements of our nature, is nearly always put in harness 
to some humdrum utilitarian end.) As a matter of fact, there are very few "primitive" civilizations 
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that do not consume an exceedingly large share of their energies in the pursuit of the remoter 
ends. Art for art's sake may be a psychological fact on these less sophisticated levels; it is 
certainly not a cultural fact.
On our own level of civilization the remoter ends tend to split off from the immediate ones 
and to assume the form of a spiritual escape from the pursuit of the latter. It is easy to 
demonstrate this drift by examples taken out of our daily experience. While in most primitive 
civilizations the dance is apt to be a ritual activity at least ostensibly associated with purposes of 
an economic nature, it is with us a merely and self-consciously pleasurable activity that not only 
splits off from the pursuit of immediate ends but even tends to assume a position of hostility to 
that sphere. In a primitive civilization a great chief dances as a matter of course, with us the 
captain of industry either refuses to dance at all or does so as a half-contemptuous concession to 
the tyranny of social custom. On the other hand, the artist of a Ballet Russe has sublimated the 
dance to an exquisite instrument of self- expression, providing himself with an adequate cultural 
recompense for his loss of mastery in the realm of direct ends. The captain of industry is one of 
the comparatively small class of individuals that has inherited something of the feeling of control 
over the attainment of direct ends that belongs by cultural right to primitive man; the ballet 
dancer has saved and intensified for himself the feeling of spontaneous participation and 
creativeness in the world of indirect ends that also belongs by cultural right to primitive man. 
Each has saved part of the wreckage of a submerged culture for himself.
The psychology of direct and indirect ends undergoes a gradual modification in the higher 
levels of civilization. The immediate ends continue to exercise the same tyrannical sway in the 
ordering of our lives, but as our spiritual selves become enriched and develop a more and more 
inordinate craving for subtler forms of experience, the immediate ends cease to be felt as chief 
ends and gradually become necessary means, but only means, toward the attainment of the more 
remote ends. These remoter ends become the chief ends of life. This change of attitude is implied 
in the statement that the art, science, and religion of a higher civilization best express its spirit or 
culture.
The transformation of ends is of the greatest cultural importance because it acts as a powerful 
force for the preservation of culture in levels in which a fragmentary economic functioning of the 
individual is inevitable. So long as the individual retains a sense of control over the major goods 
of life, he is able to take his place in the cultural patrimony of his people. Now that the major 
goods of life have shifted so largely from the realm of immediate to that of remote ends, it 
becomes a cultural necessity for all who would not be looked upon as disinherited to share in the 
pursuit of these remoter ends. No harmony and depth of life, no culture, is possible when activity 
is well-nigh circumscribed by the sphere of immediate ends and when functioning within that 
sphere is so fragmentary as to have no inherent intelligibility or interest. Here lies the grimmest 
joke of our present American civilization. The vast majority of us, deprived of any but an 
insignificant and culturally abortive share in the satisfaction of the immediate wants of mankind, 
are further deprived of both opportunity and stimulation to share in the production of non-
utilitarian values. Part of the time we are dray horses; the rest of the time we are listless 
consumers of goods. Our spiritual selves go hungry pretty much all of the time.
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III. THE CULTURED INDIVIDUAL AND THE CULTURAL GROUP
There is no real opposition between the culture of the group and an individual culture. The 
two are interdependent. A healthy national culture is never a passively accepted heritage from the 
past, but implies the creative participation of the members of the community; implies, in other 
words, the presence of cultured individuals. An automatic perpetuation of standardized values 
leads to the dominance of impersonal formulas. The individual is left out in the cold; the culture 
becomes a manner rather than a way of life, it ceases to be genuine. It is just as true, however, 
that the individual is helpless without a cultural heritage to work on. He cannot, out of his 
unaided spiritual powers, weave a strong cultural fabric instinct with the flush of his own 
personality. Creation is a bending of form to one's will, not a manufacture of form ex nihilo. If 
the passive perpetuator of a cultural tradition gives us merely a manner, the creator from out of a 
cultural waste gives us hardly more than a gesture or a yawp.
There is a curious notion afloat that "new" countries are especially favorable soil for the 
formation of a virile culture. By new is meant something old that has been transplanted to a 
background devoid of historical associations. There is nothing more tenuous, more shamelessly 
imitative and external, less virile and self-joyous, than the cultures of so-called "new countries." 
The environments of these transplanted cultures are new, the cultures themselves are old with the 
sickly age of arrested development. If signs of a genuine blossoming of culture are belatedly 
beginning to appear in America, it is not because America is still new; rather is America coming 
of age, beginning to feel a little old. In a genuinely new country, the preoccupation with the 
immediate ends of existence reduces creativeness in the sphere of the more remote ends to a 
minimum. The net result is a perceptible dwarfing of culture. The old stock of non-material 
cultural becomes progressively impoverished, and ends by being ill-adjusted to the economic and 
social environment. The more sensitive spirits tend to break with it altogether and to begin anew 
with a frank recognition of the new environmental conditions. Such new starts are invariably 
crude; they are long in bearing the fruits of a genuine culture.
The most decisive cultural influences of personality, the most fruitful revolts, are discernible 
in those environments that have long and richly streaming culture. So far from being suffocated 
in an atmosphere of endless precedent, the creative spirit gains sustenance and vigor for its own 
unfolding and may swing free of that very atmosphere with a poise hardly dreamed of by the 
timid iconoclasts of unformed cultures. Not otherwise could we understand the cultural history of 
modern Europe. Only in a mature and richly differentiated soil could arise the iconoclasms and 
visions of an Anatole France, a Nietzsche, an Ibsen, a Tolstoi. In America, at least in the America 
of yesterday, these iconoclasms would either have been strangled in the cradle would have half-
developed into a crude and pathetic isolation. There is no individual incorporation of a cultured 
ideal without the soil of a genuine communal culture; and no genuine communal culture without 
the transforming energies of personalities saturated with the cultural values of their time and 
place. The highest type of culture is thus locked in the embrace of an endless chain. Such a 
culture avoids the two extremes of "externality" - the externality of surfeit, which weighs down 
the individual, and the externality of barrenness. The former is the decay of Alexandrianism, in 
which the individual is no more; the latter, the combined immaturity and decay of an uprooted 
culture, in which the individual is not yet. Both types of externality may be combined in the 
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same culture, frequently in the same person. Thus, it is not uncommon to find in America 
individuals who have had engrafted on a barren and purely utilitarian culture a cultural tradition 
that apes a grace already embalmed. This juxtaposition of incongruous atmospheres is even 
typical in certain circles.
Let us look more closely at the place of the individual in a modern sophisticated culture. I 
have insisted that a genuine culture is one that gives its bearers a sense of inner satisfaction, a 
feeling of spiritual mastery. In the higher levels of civilization this sense of mastery is all but 
withdrawn from the economic sphere. It must feed on the non-economic spheres of human 
activity. The individual is thus driven to the identification of himself with some non-economic 
interests. For instance, a mediocre person moderately gifted with the ability to express his 
aesthetic instincts in plastic form and exercising that gift in his own sincere and humble way is a 
more cultured individual than a person of brilliant endowments who has acquainted himself in a 
general way with all the "best" that has been thought and felt and done, but who has never 
succeeded in bringing any portion of his interests into direct relation with the innermost shrine of 
his personality. An individual of the latter type, for all his brilliance, we call "flat." A flat person 
cannot be truly cultured. Direct creativeness is [not] essential for the development of individual 
culture. It is possible to gain a sense of the required mastery by linking one's own personality 
with that of the great minds and hearts that society has recognized as its significant creators, so 
long as such linking is attended by some portion of the effort, the fluttering toward realization 
that is inseparable from all creative effort. It is to be feared, however, that the self-discipline that 
is here implied is none too often practiced. The linking, as I have called it, of self with master 
soul too often degenerates into a pleasurable servitude. The pleasurable servitude may degenerate 
still further into a vice. Those of us who are not altogether blind can see in certain of our 
acquaintances, if not in ourselves, an indulgence in aesthetic or scientific goods that is strictly 
comparable to the abuse of alcohol. Both types of self-ignoring or self-submerging habit are 
signs of a debilitated personality; both are antithetical to the formation of culture.
The individual self, then, in aspiring to culture, fastens upon the accumulated cultural goods 
of its society for stimulus and [for] the orientation derived in a world of cultural values. The 
orientation is necessary to give the self a modus vivendi with society. The individual needs to 
assimilate much of the cultural background of his society to prevent his self- expression from 
degenerating into social sterility. A spiritual hermit may be genuinely cultured, but he is hardly 
socially so. To say that individual culture must needs grow organically out of the rich soil of a 
communal culture is far from saying that it must be forever tied to that culture by the leading 
strings of its own childhood. Once the individual self has grown strong enough to travel in the 
path most dearly illuminated by its own light, it not only can but should discard much of the 
scaffolding by which it has made its ascent. Nothing is more pathetic than the persistence with 
which well-meaning applicants to culture attempt to keep up or revive cultural stimuli which 
have long outlived their significance for the growth of personality. To keep up or brush up one's 
Greek, for example, in those numerous cases in which a knowledge of Greek has ceased to bear a 
genuine relation to the needs of the spirit, is almost a spiritual crime. If the traveling in the path 
of the self's illumination leads to a position that is destructive of the very values the self was fed 
on, as happened with Nietzsche and with Tolstoi, it has not in the slightest lost touch with 
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genuine culture. It may well, on the contrary, have arrived at its own highest possible point of 
cultural development.
Nietzsche and Tolstoi, however, are extreme types of personality. There is no danger that the 
vast army of cultured humanity will ever come to occupy spiritual positions of such rigor and 
originality. The real danger is in submitting to the remorselessly leveling forces of a common 
cultural heritage and of the action of average mind on average mind. The caution to conformity 
with tradition, which the champions of culture so often feel themselves called upon to announce, 
is one that we can generally dispense with. It is rather the opposite caution, the caution to 
conformity with the essential nature of one's own personality, that needs urging as a counter-
irritant to the flat and tedious sameness of spiritual outlook, the anemic make-believe, the smug 
intolerance of the challenging, that so imprison our American souls.
No greater test of the genuineness of both individual and communal culture can be applied 
than the attitude adopted toward the past. The genuinely cultured individual or society does not 
contemptuously reject the past. They honor the works of the past, but not because they are gems 
of historical chance, not because, being out of our reach, they must needs be looked at through 
the enshrining glass of museum cases. These works of the past still excite our heartfelt interest 
because they may be recognized as the expression of a human spirit warmly akin, despite all 
differences of outward garb, to our own. This is equivalent to saying that the past is of cultural 
interest only when it is still the present or may yet become the future. Paradoxical as it may 
seem, the historical spirit has always acted in some measure as an unwitting deterrent of the 
cultural utilization of the past. The historical spirit says, "Beware, those thoughts and those 
feelings that you so rashly think to embody in the warp and woof of your own spirit - they are of 
other time and of other place and they issue from alien motives. In bending over them you do but 
obscure them with the shadow of your own spirit." This cool reserve is an excellent mood for the 
making of historical science; its usefulness to the building of culture in the present is doubtful. 
We know more about Hellenic antiquity than did the scholars and artists of the Renaissance; it 
would be folly to pretend that our utilization of the Hellenic spirit is comparable to the the 
creative stimulus, that those men of the Renaissance obtained from its fragmentary and garbled 
tradition. 
It is difficult to think of a renaissance of that type today. We walk so gingerly in the paths of 
the past for fear of stepping on anachronisms, that, wearied with fatigue, we sink into a heavy 
doze, to be awakened only by the insistent clatter of the present. It may be that in our present 
state of detachment, is not only unavoidable but essential for the preservation of our own 
individualities. The past is now more of a past than ever before. Perhaps we should expect less of 
it than ever before. Or rather expect no more of it than it hold its portals wide open, that we may 
enter in and despoil it of what bits we choose for our pretty mosaics. Can it be that the critical 
sense of history, which galvanizes the past into scientific life, is destined to slay it for the life of 
culture? More probably, what is happening is that the spiritual currents of today are running so 
fast, so turbulently, that we find it difficult to get a culturally vital perspective of the past, which 
is, for the time being, left as a glorified mummy in the hands of the pundits. And those of us who 
take their culture neither as knowledge nor as manner, but as life, will ask the past not so much 
"what?" and "when?" and "where?" as "how?" and the accent of their "how" will be modulated in 
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accordance with the needs of the spirit of each, a spirit that is free to glorify, to transform, and to 
reject.
To summarize the place of the individual in our theory of culture, we may say that the pursuit 
of genuine culture implies two types of reconciliation. The self seeks instinctively for mastery. In 
the process of acquiring a sense of mastery that is not crude but pro- portioned to the degree of 
sophistication proper to our time, the self is compelled to suffer an abridgment and to undergo a 
molding. The extreme differentiation of function which the progress of man has forced upon the 
individual menaces the spirit; we have no recourse but to submit with good grace to this 
abridgment of our activity, but it must not be allowed to clip the wings of the spirit unduly. This 
is the first and most important reconciliation — the finding of a full world of spiritual 
satisfactions within the limits of a  confined economic activity. 
The self must set itself at a point where it can, if not embrace the whole spiritual life of its 
group, at least catch enough of its rays to burst into light and flame. Moreover, the self must 
learn to reconcile its own strivings with the general spiritual life of the community. It must be 
content to borrow sustenance from the spiritual consciousness of that community and of its past, 
that it may grow where its power, great or little, will be brought to bear on a spiritual life that is 
of intimate concern to other wills. Yet, despite all reconciliations, the self has a right to grow as 
an integral, self-poised, spiritual growth, whose ultimate justifications rest in itself. The 
conception of the self as a mere instrument toward the attainment of communal ends lead[s] in 
the long run to psychological absurdities and to spiritual slavery. It is the self that concedes, if 
there is to be any concession. Spiritual freedom, what there is of it, is not alms dispensed by the 
social body. 
Wherever there is discussion of culture, emphasis is instinctively placed upon art. If we 
would catch something of the spirit of a bygone period or of an exotic civilization, we turn first 
to its art. For it the highest manifestations of culture necessarily rest[s] in art, for the reason that 
art is the authentic expression, in satisfying form, of experience; experience not as logically 
ordered by science, but as directly and intuitively presented to us in life. As culture rests on the 
harmonious development of the sense of mastery instinctively sought by each individual soul, 
art, the form of consciousness in which the impress of the self is most direct, is bound to reflect 
culture. To relate our lives to forms of expression that carry conviction to others and make us live 
again in these others is the highest spiritual satisfaction we know of, the highest welding of one's 
individuality with the spirit of his civilization. Were art ever really perfect in expression, it would 
indeed be immortal. Even the greatest art, however, is full of the dross of conventionality, of the 
particular sophistications of its age. As these change, the directness of expression in any work of 
art tends [is] increasingly hampered by something fixed and alien, until it gradually falls into 
oblivion. While art lives, it belongs to culture; in the degree that it takes on the frigidity of death, 
it becomes of interest only to the study of civilization. Thus all art appreciation (and production, 
for that matter) has two faces. It is unfortunate that the face directed to civilization is so often 
confounded with that which is fixed on culture.
IV. THE GEOGRAPHY OF CULTURE
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An oft-noted peculiarity of the development of culture is the fact that it reaches its greatest 
heights in comparatively small, autonomous groups. In fact, it is doubtful if a genuine culture 
ever properly belongs to more than such a restricted group, a group between the members of 
which there can be said to be something like direct intensive spiritual contact. This direct contact 
is enriched by the common cultural heritage; it is rendered swift and pregnant by the thousands 
of feelings and ideas that constantly glimmer in the background. Such small, culturally 
autonomous groups were the Athens of the Periclean Age [and] the London of Elizabethan days. 
It is customary to speak of these groups as though they were identical with widely extended 
groups and cultures. Such usages are really figures of speech, substitutions of a part for the 
whole. It is astonishing, for instance, how much the so-called "history of French literature" is 
really the history of literary activity in the city of Paris. True enough, a narrowly localized 
culture may spread its influence far beyond its properly restricted sphere. Sometimes it sets the 
pace for a whole nationality, for a far-flung empire. It can do so, however, only at the expense of 
diluting in spirit as it moves away from its home, of degenerating into an imitative attitudinizing. 
If we realized what the rapid spread of a culture entails, to what an extent it conquers by crushing 
the germs of healthier autonomous growths, we would be less eager to welcome uniformizing 
tendencies. A culture may well be quickened from without, but its supersession by another is no 
cultural gain. Whether or not it is attended by a political gain does not concern us here. That is 
why the deliberate attempt to impose a culture directly and speedily, no matter how backed by 
good will, is an affront to the human spirit. When such an attempt is backed, not by good will, 
but by military ruthlessness, it is the greatest conceivable crime against the human spirit, it is the 
very denial of culture.
Does this mean that we must turn our back on all internationalistic tendencies and vegetate 
forever in our nationalisms? Here we are confronted by the prevalent fallacy that 
internationalism is opposed to the development of autonomous cultures. The fallacy fail[s] to 
realize that internationalism, nationalism, and localism are forms that can be given various 
contents. We cannot intelligently discuss internationalism before we know what it is that we are 
to be internationalistic about. Unfortunately we are so obsessed by the idea of subordinating all 
forms of human association to the state and of regarding the range of all types of activity as 
conterminous with political boundaries, that it is difficult for us to reconcile the idea of a local or 
restrictedly national autonomy of culture with a purely political state-sovereignty and with an 
economic-political internationalism.
No one can see clearly the larger outcome of the present world conflicts. They may 
exacerbate rather than allay national-political animosities. But this deplorable result cannot well 
be other than a passing phase. Even now it is evident that the war has, in more ways than one, 
paved the way for an economic and semi-political internationalism. All those spheres of activity 
that relate to the satisfaction of immediate ends will tend to become international functions. 
However the internationalizing processes will shape themselves, they will at bottom be but the 
reflection of that growing impatience of the human spirit with the preoccupation with direct 
ends. Such transnational problems as the distribution of economic goods, the transportation of 
commodities, the control of highways, the coinage, and numerous others, must eventually pass 
into the hands of international organizations for the simple reason that men will not eternally 
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give their loyalty to the uselessly national administration of functions that are of inherently inter- 
national scope. As this international scope gets to be thoroughly realized, our present infatuations 
with national prestige in the economic sphere will show themselves for the spiritual imbecilities 
that they are.
All this has much to do with the eventual development of culture. As long as culture is 
looked upon as a decorative appanage of large political units, its preservation is bound up with 
these units. But genuine culture is inconceivable except on the basis of a highly individual 
spiritual consciousness, it rarely remains healthy when spread thin over an interminable area, and 
in its higher reaches it is in no mood to submit to economic and political bonds. Now a 
generalized international culture is hardly thinkable. The national-political unit tends to arrogate 
culture to itself and up to a certain point it succeeds in doing so, but only at the price of serious 
cultural impoverishment of vast portions of its terrain. If the economic and political integrity of 
these large state-controlled units becomes undermined by the growth of international functions, 
their cultural raison d'etre must also weaken. Culture must then tend with ever increasing 
intensity to cling to relatively small social and political units, units that are not too large to 
incorporate the individuality that is to culture as the very breath of life. Between these two 
processes, the integration of economic and political forces into a world sovereignty and the 
disintegration of our present unwieldy culture units into small units whose life is truly virile and 
individual, the fetich of the present state may in the dim future be trusted to melt away. The 
political state of today has long been on trial and has been found wanting. Our national-political 
units are too small for peace, too large for safety. They are too small for the intelligent solution of 
the large problems in the sphere of direct ends; they are too large for the fruitful enrichment of 
the remoter ends, for culture.
It is in the New World that the unsatisfactory nature of a geographically widespread culture is 
manifest. To find substantially the same cultural manifestations in New York and Chicago and 
San Francisco is saddening. It argues a shallowness in the culture itself and a readiness to 
imitation in its bearers that is not reassuring. Even if no definite way out of the cultural morass is 
discernible for the present, there is no good in basking forever in self-sufficiency. It can only be 
of benefit to search out the depths of our hearts and to find wherein they are wanting. If we 
exaggerate our weakness, it does not matter; better chastening than self-glorification. We have 
been in the habit of giving ourselves credit for essentially quantitative results that are due rather 
to an unusually favoring nature and to a favoring set of economic conditions than to anything in 
ourselves. Our victories have been brilliant, but they have also too often been barren for culture. 
The habit of playing with loaded dice has given us a dangerous attitude of passivity — 
dangerous, that is, for culture. Stretching back opulently in our easy chairs, we expect great 
cultural things to happen to us. We have wound up the machinery, it is "up to" culture to come 
forth, in heavy panoply. The minute increment of individuality which alone makes culture in the 
self and eventually builds up a culture in the community seems somehow overlooked. Canned 
culture is so much easier to administer.
Just now we are expecting a great deal from the European war. No doubt the war and its 
aftermath will shake us out of some part of our smugness and let in a few invigorating air 
currents of cultural influence, but, if we are not careful, these influences may harden into new 
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standardizations or become diluted into another stock of imitative attitudes. The war and its 
aftermath cannot be a sufficient cultural cause, they are at best but another set of favoring 
conditions. Sooner or later we shall have to get down to the humble task of exploring the depths 
of our consciousness and dragging to the light what sincere bits of reflected experience we can 
find. These bits will not always be beautiful, they will not always be pleasing, but they will be 
genuine. And then we can build. In time, in plenty of time — for we must have patience — a 
genuine culture — better yet, a series of linked autonomous cultures — will grace our lives. And 
New York and Chicago and San Francisco will live each in its own cultural strength, not 
squinting from one to another to see which gets ahead in a race for external values, but each 
serenely oblivious of its rivals because growing in a soil of genuine cultural values.
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